Resilient plant monitoring systems are sensor networks that degrade gracefully under malicious attacks on their sensors, causing them to project misleading information. This paper develops techniques to ensure resiliency and illustrates their application using a power plant. Specific techniques developed are: active data quality acquisition, process variable and plant condition assessments, sensor network adaptation, and plant decomposition with knowledge fusion. Based on these techniques, a five-layer resilient monitoring architecture is proposed and analyzed under various cyber-physical attack scenarios. As quantified by Kullback-Leibler divergence, in all scenarios considered, the system offers effective protection against misleading information and identifies the plant conditions -normal or anomalous -in a reliable manner.
conditions could be erroneous. This may lead to wrong actions on the part of the operator and, possibly, a disaster. To prevent this situation, the monitoring system must possess a capability of autonomously identifying the attacked sensors and mitigating their effect (by discounting or disregarding completely the data they project). Although the loss of sensors may lead to degradation of plant condition assessment, in a well-designed system this degradation should be "proportional" to the severity of the attack, i.e., graceful. Plant monitoring systems that possess such a property are referred to as resilient. This paper is devoted to developing techniques that can be used to ensure resiliency, analyzing their properties and, on this basis, designing and evaluating the performance of a resilient monitoring system.
A specific application, in terms of which the development is carried out, is a simplified model of a power plant, although a similar approach can be used for other applications as well.
B. Scenario and problem addressed
Briefly, the scenario considered in this paper is as follows:
• The monitored plant process variables, V i , i = 1, ..., M , are characterized by probability density functions (pdf's) fṼ i (ṽ i ), i = 1, ..., M . In practice, the status of the process variables is often characterized as being Normal (N) or Anomalous (A). The latter could be, for instance, Low (L) or High (H). In this case, fṼ i (ṽ i ) induces a random event with the outcomes in {L Vi , N Vi , H Vi }, i = 1, ..., M . With a slight abuse of terminology, we refer to this event (and similar events throughout this paper) as a discrete random variable, V i , i = 1, ...M , with the probability mass function (pmf), p[V i ], defined on the universal set Σ Vi = {L Vi , N Vi , H Vi }, i = 1, ..., M .
• The plant, G, is also characterized by its status, which is a discrete random variable, G, with the pmf p[G] defined by the pmf's of process variables and taking values on Σ G = {N G , A G }, where N G and A G denote the normal and anomalous plant statuses, respectively. Depending on the plant, the anomalous status can be further characterized by specific anomalies, e.g., boiler insulation damaged, turbine malfunctioning, etc. In each status, plant dynamics may be different, e.g., described by different transfer functions.
• Each process variable, V i , is monitored by a sensor, S i (multiple sensors of a process variable are also considered in the sequel). If a sensor is under attack, its projected data may have a pdf, fS indicate that the process variable is Normal, while in reality it is Low or High.
• The plant status assessment is based on the process variable assessments,p[V i ], and is quantified by a pmf denoted asp [G] , G ∈ {N G , A G }. Since, as indicated above, the process variable assessments may be erroneous,p[G] may be quite different from the actual p[G] and, thus, lead to erroneous actions by the plant operator.
In this scenario, the optimal resilient monitoring system must be able to identify the status of the plant, G, in such a manner that the "distance" between the estimated and the actual pmf's,p [G] and p [G] , is minimized, as quantified by an appropriate measure of distance between the two pmf's. While this paper is not intended to solve this problem, here we design a plant monitoring system that degrades gracefully under an attack (i.e., is resilient), and demonstrate that it performs favorably in comparison with a non-resilient one (as quantified by a measure of resiliency based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence [1] ).
C. Contributions of this work: Techniques developed and resilient monitoring system designed
The main techniques developed in this work are as follows:
• The "trustworthiness" of a sensor is quantified by a parameter referred to as data quality (DQ), which takes values on [0, 1], with 1 indicating that the sensor is totally trustworthy and 0 not trustworthy at all. To identify DQ, we develop an active data quality acquisition procedure, whereby probing signals are applied to process variables, and the level of disagreement between the anticipated and the actual response of the sensors is used to quantify their DQ's.
• The estimates of process variables pmf's,p[V i ], i = 1, ..., M , are calculated based on the data projected by the sensors and their DQ's. Since DQ is not a statistical quantity, classical statistics cannot be used for this purpose. Therefore, we introduce a model of the DQ's effect on the coupling between sensors data and process variables and, using this model, develop the so-called h-procedure (which is a modified stochastic approximation algorithm [2] ). Analyzing this procedure, we show that it converges to a steady state defined by the DQ's. Specifically, if DQ = 1, it converges to the actual process variable pmf; as DQ tends to 0, the steady state of the h-procedure converges to a uniform pmf, implying that in this limit the sensor measurements carry no information at all. For all other DQ's, the conditional pmf of V i given the sensor data is an affine function of DQ. When multiple sensors monitor a process variable, the Dempster-Shafer rule [3] is used to combine the steady states of the h-procedures associated with each sensor.
• The estimate of the plant status pmf,p [G] , is calculated based on the statistical plant model (typically given as a set of conditional pmf's P [V i |G], i = 1, ..., M , or a joint conditional pmf P [V 1 , V 2 , ..., V M |G]), the estimates of the process variables pmf's,p[V i ], i = 1, ..., M , and the Jeffrey rule [4] .
• The above assessments are carried out at each state of the sensor network, where the state is a vector of 1's and 0's, with 1 indicating that the corresponding sensor is taken into account for process variable assessment and 0 that it is not. The quality of each state is quantified by the entropy (i.e., the level of uncertainty) of eitherp [G] orp [V i ]. The adaptation of the sensor network to the optimal state, i.e., the state with the smallest entropy, is carried out using the so-called rational controllers [5] , which are decision making devices that reside mostly in states, where the penalty function (i.e., entropy) is minimized.
• As mentioned above, the adaptation can be carried out using the entropy of eitherp [G] orp [V i ]. The former, which we refer to as centralized, suffers from the curse of dimensionality: the adaptation time grows exponentially with the number of sensors in the network. To combat this problem, a decentralized system, with adaptation based onp[V i ], could be used. In the case of a power plant, this decentralized system is comprised of sub-plants, e.g., boiler, turbine, reheat pipe, etc. Such a decomposition, however, impedes the derivation of inferences among the sub-plants, which, as it turns out, are important to ensure resiliency. Therefore, we develop a decentralized system based on plant decomposition with knowledge fusion and show that it leads to both mitigation of the curse of dimensionality and derivation of the above mentioned inferences.
Using these techniques, we design a resilient plant monitoring system consisting of the following five layers: data quality acquisition, process variable assessment, adaptation, knowledge fusion, and sub-plant assessment. The subsequent sections describe in details each of the developed techniques, along with the overall architecture and performance evaluation of the resulting monitoring system.
D. Related literature
The literature related to the topic of this paper can be classified into four groups. The first one is devoted to foundational issues, where the problems of resilient monitoring and control are motivated and formulated [6] - [10] . The second group includes publications on control-theoretic methods for attack identification and alleviation, [11] - [13] . In these publications, the authors consider LTI systems with a given state space realization (A, B, C, D) and disturbances interpreted as attack vectors. The problem addressed is to identify the attack and, if possible, mitigate its effect, for instance, by designing a controller that makes the closed-loop system invariant with respect to the disturbance-attack. The main difference of the current work is that the plant may be either normal or anomalous (i.e., described by several state space realizations), and the problem is to identify which plant status indeed takes place, in spite of the misleading information projected by the sensors.
The third group consists of publications on fault tolerant control, [14] - [16] . In these works, it is assumed that a closed-loop system has multiple sensors and actuators, some of which could be faulty due to natural or malicious causes. The typical problem here is to determine the conditions (e.g., the number of sensors and actuators) under which the closed-loop system performance is maintained without degradation. The difference of the current work is that, although multiple sensors may be present, the goal is to determine the status of the plant and, if otherwise impossible, tolerate degradation.
The fourth group consists of research on monitoring communication channels in order to capture anomalous traffic and correlate it with a possible attack, [17] - [19] . In terms of the current work, this implies the identification of DQ. The main tools used here are hypothesis testing and clustering techniques. While the results of [17] - [19] may be useful for resilient plant monitoring, they do not provide methods for process variable and plant condition assessment pursued in the current work.
Our preliminary results on resilient monitoring systems have been reported in conference presentations [20] - [23] and summarized in article [24] . In the current paper, along with reviewing and extending some of these results, we introduce and investigate a decentralized monitoring system based on plant decomposition with knowledge fusion, as a means for combating the curse of dimensionality that mars the performance of the system developed in [20] - [24] . While the decomposition of the plant into sub-plants induces a sensor network decomposition into sub-networks, alleviating thereby the curse of dimensionality, the subsequent knowledge fusion allows for recovering inferences, which are necessary for resiliency. The implementation of this approach necessitates developing a sensor network adaptation technique based on process variable assessments,p[V i ], calculating inter-and intra-sub-plant inferences, and designing and investigating the efficacy of a five-layer resilient monitoring system. These developments are described in the current paper, along with an application to monitoring a simplified model of a power plant.
E. Paper outline
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II addresses the issue of active data quality acquisition. In Section III, the h-procedure and associated techniques for process variable assessment are described. Section IV is devoted to plant pmf assessment. The sensor network adaptation is discussed in Section V, where a practical consequence of the curse of dimensionality is quantified. An approach to combatting the curse of dimensionality based on a decentralized system with knowledge fusion is developed in Section VI. The resulting five-layer monitoring system architecture is presented in Section VII. An application to a power plant is discussed and investigated by simulations in Section VIII. Finally, the conclusions and directions for future work are given in Section IX. All proofs and the parameters of the power plant model are included in the Appendices.
II. ACTIVE DATA QUALITY ACQUISITION
In this section, we describe an approach to DQ evaluation briefly mentioned in Subsection I-C.
Consider sensor S intended to monitor process variable V and assume that the following holds: Assumption 1. (i) Process variable V is quantified by a continuous random variableṼ , taking values in the domainṼ ∈ [V min , V max ]; its pdf, fṼ (ṽ), is unknown.
(ii) The random variableṼ induces a discrete random variable V , which describes the status of V and takes values on
with the pmf given by
where R 1 and R 2 are known and V min < R 1 < R 2 < V max (V 's with outcomes other than Low, Normal, and High can be introduced similarly). Since fṼ (ṽ) is unknown, the pmf of V is also unknown.
(iii) The d.c. gain, α V , of V with respect to its control input, U V (e.g., fuel valve of the boiler), depends on the status of V, i.e., whether it is Low, Normal, or High. This is formalized by assuming that α V is a priori known piecewise constant function of the expected value ofṼ (denoted as µṼ ):
In the case of other than L, N, and H anomalies, α V is introduced similarly. (Note that we use here the d.c. gain, rather than the full transfer function, in order to require as little information about the plant as possible. Also, various other dependencies of α V on µṼ can be considered; for instance, α V could be assumed to be a piecewise linear function of µṼ ; expression (3) is used here for simplicity.) (iv) The data projected by sensor S is quantified by a continuous random variableS, taking values oñ S ∈ [V min , V max ]; its pdf, fS(s), can be evaluated using the classical statistical methods (based on the sensor measurements).
(v) The random variableS induces a discrete random variable S taking values on
where R 1 and R 2 are the same as in (2) . Since fS(s) may be viewed as known, the pmf of S is known as well.
(vi) If S is not attacked, µS = µṼ , where µS is the expected value ofS. If S is under attack, µS = µṼ and the pmf's of S and V may be qualitatively different; for instance, max Under Assumption 1, the active data quality acquisition is carried out as follows: Introduce a probing signal using the control input U V . Any type of deterministic or random probing signals could be used.
Here, we use the simplest probe − a rectangular pulse with amplitude A V and duration T , applied at the time instant t 0 , i.e.,
The value of A V is selected sufficiently small so that
value of T is selected so thatṼ reaches a small vicinity of its steady state defined by the probe.
If the sensor is not under attack, i.e., µS = µṼ , the following takes place:
where µ ′S is the expected value ofS after the probe and α V is the d.c. gain defined in (3) . If the sensor is attacked, (7) does not hold. In order to quantify the severity of the attack, introduce the notion of probing inconsistency (P IC S ) defined by:
Clearly P IC S = 0 implies that the sensor is not attacked; P IC S > 0 indicates an attack and its severity.
Given this P IC S , the DQ of sensor S is defined as:
where F ( · ) is a strictly increasing function of P IC S with F (0) = 0. Note that if F (P IC S ) grows too fast, then DQ will be small even for relatively small P IC S 's; if it grows too slow, DQ is relatively large even for large P IC S 's. Our numerical study, reported in [21] , indicates that a quadratic F ( · ) provides better results for subsequent utilization than a linear one. Therefore, we introduce this function as
where ǫ is a sufficiently small positive number and P IC max,S is the largest value attainable by P IC S .
Clearly, due to (9) and (10), minDQ S = ǫ, which can be viewed as a design parameter.
Expressions (1)- (10) 
III. PROCESS VARIABLE PMF ASSESSMENT
In this section, we describe an approach to the evaluation of process variable pmf,p[V ]. As mentioned in Subsection I-C, this pmf is evaluated based on the sensors data and their DQ's. If the DQ were 1, this could be accomplished using classical statistics. However, these methods cannot be applied if 0 ≤ DQ < 1. Therefore, to carry out this evaluation, a model of the effect of DQ on the coupling between V and S must be postulated and then, in the framework of this model, a novel statistical method for pmf's evaluation should be developed. Below, this development is carried out, and methods for pmf evaluation using a single and multiple sensors, as well as inferences among the process variables, are introduced.
A. Model of V and S coupling
Introduce the notion of sensor believability:
where |Σ V | is the cardinality of the universal set of V . If, as indicated in (1), |Σ V | = 3, then
The last two equations imply that when DQ = 1, believability is also 1; when DQ = 0, believability is 1 |ΣV | , implying that every status of V is equally likely. Using the believability, introduce Assumption 2. The coupling between V and S is as follows:
whereσ implies 'not σ' and σ,σ ∈ Σ V .
Clearly, this implies that if DQ = 1, then V has the same status as S with probability 1; if DQ = 0, every status of V is equally probable, irrespective of the status of S. The coupling (12) is used throughout this paper.
B. Process variable pmf assessment using a single sensor
Consider a sensor S intended to monitor process variable V and assume that Assumption 1 holds. As indicated above, our goal is to evaluate the pmf of V , based on the sensor data, s 1 , s 2 , ..., s n , ... (where the subscript is the time index) and its data quality DQ S . In other words, we are interested in
To accomplish this, consider
and introduce, for convenience, the notation
Obviously, the limit of h σ (n), ∀σ ∈ Σ V , as n → ∞ (if it exists) is the sought pmf,p [V ] . Define the evolution of h σ (n) as follows:
where the set point, h * σ (s n+1 ), is given by
and the step, ǫ h , is either a small number,
or a function of n monotonically converging to 0 so that
As it follows from (16), the evolution of h σ (n) depends on both the sensor data and DQ S (through β S ). The system of equations (15), (16) is referred to as the h-procedure. It can be viewed as a stochastic approximation algorithm [2] with a random set point. 1) There exists a sufficiently small ǫ 0 , such that for all 0 < ǫ h < ǫ 0 , recursive procedure (15)- (17) converges in probability as n → ∞ to the following limit:
2) Under (18) , recursive procedure (15) , (16) converges to the same limit almost surely.
Proof: Part 1 is proved in [24] . The proof of Part 2 is given in the Appendix. Recursive procedure (15) , (16) is the basis of process variable assessments used throughout this paper.
C. Process variable pmf assessment using multiple sensors
Assume that process variable V is monitored by two sensors, S 1 and S 2 , having data quality, DQ S1 and DQ S2 , respectively. The goal is to evaluatep[V ] based on the data projected by both sensors, i.e.,
This can be accomplished by combining the two pmf's, evaluated based on the h-procedure, i.e.,p S1
[V ]
, into a single pmf,p S1,S2 [V ], using the Dempster-Shafer rule [3] : 
and introduce:
Thus, only ifp
are DS-monotonic, the combined pmf (21) is beneficial; otherwise, the pmf from one sensor (either S 1 or S 2 ), having the smallest entropy, should be utilized. 
D. Process variable pmf assessment using inferences
Consider a plant characterized by two process variables, V 1 and V 2 , monitored by sensors S 1 and S 2 , respectively, and operating in accordance with Assumption 1. Denote the universal sets of V 1 as Σ V1 and V 2 as Σ V2 . Assume that these process variables are coupled by conditional pmf'
For instance, if V 1 and V 2 are the temperatures of the boiler and turbine, respectively, these conditional pmf's may be of the form
where the columns represent the states of the condition and the rows that of the random variable itself.
Clearly, (24) implies that if V 2 is Normal, V 1 is Normal as well, while if V 1 is Normal, V 2 may be either Normal, or Low, or High. Using these conditional pmf's, the pmf of V 1 (resp., V 2 ) can be assessed not only by the data and DQ of S 1 , (resp., S 2 ), but also by those of S 2 (resp., S 1 ). This is important because it offers a possibility of assessing the status of a process variable even if its sensor has DQ = 0.
To describe this inference procedure, letp
denote the pmf's of V 1 and V 2 , respectively, evaluated based on the data and DQ of S 2 . Obviously,p S2 [V 2 ] can be evaluated using the h-procedure (15), (16) . Then,p S2 [V 1 ] can be computed using P [V 1 |V 2 ] and the total probability formula:
Thus, V 1 is assessed using S 2 . Having bothp 
(b) Calculate the initial joint pmf of V i and G:
(c) Calculate the marginal probability:
(d) Apply the Jeffrey rule [4] :p
(e) Marginalize to obtain the plant pmf estimate:
(f) If M > 1, combine the pmf's obtained in (30) using the Dempster-Shafer rule:
If the plant model is given as
and then follow steps (a)-(f) above.
Algorithm 1 is carried out after the h-procedure has converged andp[
To speed up the process ofp[G] evaluation, it is tempting to apply this algorithm recursively, i.e., usinĝ
As it turns out, however, this may lead to a paradox: the entropy of 
(b) Calculate the joint pmf of V i and G:
(d) Apply the Jeffrey rule:
(f) If M > 1, combine the pmf's obtained in (36) using the Dempster-Shafer rule:
(g) Update n to n + 1. Return to (a).
To investigate the performance of this algorithm, consider a plant G with process variable V, monitored by sensor S. Assume that the universal sets of G, V , and S are given by:
Further, assume that the plant model is characterized by the conditional pmf
where a < 0.5. Denote the pmf's of the process variable and the plant at time n aŝ
where h NV (n) and h AV (n) are calculated using the h-procedure (15), (16) and k NG (n) and k AG (n) are evaluated using Algorithm 2. To specify the evolution of k NG (n) and k AG (n), substitute (39) and (40) in steps (a)-(e) of this algorithm to obtain
with k NG (0) = 0.5 and C(n) and D(n) given by
Denote the steady state values of h NV (n) and h AV (n), evolving according to the h-procedure (15), (16) uncertain. In other words, this theorem implies that a recursive version of Jeffrey rule may "create erroneous information" rather than transfer it from one quantity, V i , into another, G.
V. SENSOR NETWORK ADAPTATION AND MEASURE OF RESILIENCY
As mentioned in Subsection I-C, the adaptation of sensor network to the state with minimal entropy can be carried out using either the plant or the process variable pmf's. In this section, we describe the former and in Section VII the latter.
A. Sensor network
Consider the plant G with M process variables, 
B. Adaptation using a rational controller
As mentioned in Subsection I-C, the adaptation technique used in this work is based on rational controllers introduced in [5] and further developed in [25] , [26] . Rational controllers are decision making devices that possess two properties: ergodicity and rationality. The ergodicity property implies that each state, x, of the decision space, X, is visited with a non-zero probability. The rationality property implies that the residence time in states with a smaller value of the penalty function is larger than in those with a larger one. The degree to which this distinction takes place is referred to as the level of rationality and quantified by a positive integer, N .
If the sensor network adaptation is based on the plant assessment pmf,p x [G], the penalty function is selected as its entropy, I{p x [G]} :=Î x (G). Various types of rational controller dynamics can be defined to ensure rationality and ergodicity. In this work, to ensure the former, the following residence time in each state x ∈ X is introduced:
where β > 0 is a small number (design parameter) and T max is the largest residence time (also a design parameter). To ensure ergodicity, when T x expires, the controller moves to the next state in a deterministic, round-robin manner.
Let τ x be the relative residence time in state x ∈ X, i.e.,
Then, the average plant assessment pmf, to be reported to the plant operator after each complete round-robin cycle, is evaluated asp
It can be shown that if N is sufficiently large,p[G] is arbitrarily close to arg min x∈XÎ x (G). Note that although under the deterministic, round-robin transition rule, the state with the minimal entropy could be selected by various other methods, we use (43)-(45) since it is equally applicable to random transitions, which may be necessary in other applications.
C. Measure of resiliency
The measure of resiliency employed in this work is based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence [1] is the pmf of the plant assessed under the assumption that the DQ of all sensors is 1; we refer to such a system as non-resilient and denote the resulting pmf as p nr [G] . Then, the measure of resiliency (M R) considered in this paper is given by
Clearly, M R ≤ 1, and the equality is attained whenp This is carried out in Section VIII for the case of the power plant.
D. Temporal properties of adaptation and curse of dimensionality
From the temporal point of view, the adaptation process consists of epochs; |X| epochs (where, as before, X is the sensor network state space) comprise a cycle; at the end of each cycle,p[G] is reported to the plant operator.
For each x ∈ X, the epoch consists of three periods: DQ acquisition (T DQ ), process variable(s) and plant pmf evaluation (T eval ), and residence in state x (T x ). Assuming that the sensor data are provided every 0.01sec and using the procedure described in Section II, T DQ can be evaluated as 5sec (if the time constant of the process variable is 1sec and 100 measurements are utilized to calculate the sensor mean). Using the procedures described in Sections III and IV, the duration of process variable and plant assessment, T eval , can be calculated as 6sec (if the stopping rule of the h-procedure is |h σ (n+1)−h σ (n)| < 10 −4 ). The maximum residence period, T max , can be selected as desired. If it is selected to be 1sec, the duration of each epoch is less than or equal to 12sec.
As mentioned above, |X| epochs constitute a cycle, so that the cycle duration is, at most, 12|X|sec.
Thus, the resilient monitoring system provides the plant assessment pmf,p[G], within a reporting period T report = 12|X|sec. If a network consists of 5 sensors, T report = (2 5 )12sec ≈ 6min, whereas in a network of 10 sensors, T report ≈ 3hr, which is clearly unacceptable. This curse of dimensionality is the main drawback of the centralized system based onp x [G] adaptation.
VI. COMBATTING THE CURSE OF DIMENSIONALITY: DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM WITH KNOWLEDGE

FUSION
This section provides a method for combatting the curse of dimensionality based on the plant decomposition with knowledge fusion. The development is carried out in terms of a power plant; however, the approach is applicable to other systems as well.
A. Power plant
A simplified model of a power plant is shown in Figure 1 , where B is the boiler, HT and LT are the high and low pressure turbines, respectively, RP is the reheat pipe, C is the condenser, FP is the feedwater pump, and S ij 's are the sensors. For simplicity, it is assumed that only B, HT, RP, LT may be under a To implement knowledge fusion calculations, couplings among process variables must be introduced. This is accomplished based on the conditional probabilities P [V i |V j ]. While specific matrices representing these conditional pmf's are given in Subsection VIII-A, below we describe the knowledge fusion calculations used in this work.
C. Knowledge fusion calculations
] be the process variable pmf's of the sub-plants, evaluated using the techniques described in Sections II, III, and V. Then, fusion of this information, leading to the sought inferences, is carried out as follows:
(a) Calculate the pmf of V 1 based on the sensors of LT (denoted asp GLT [V 1 ]):
(b) Calculate the pmf of V 1 based on the sensors of RP:
(c) Calculate the pmf of V 1 based on the sensors of HT:
(d) Calculate the pmf of V 1 based on all sensors of the sensor network (using the Dempster-Shafer rule):
(e) Finally, selectp * [V 1 ] as the one of the five pmf's obtained above, which has the smallest entropy,
i.e.,
Fusion of other process variable pmf's is carried out similarly, leading top
D. Accuracy of decentralized systems with knowledge fusion
In this subsection, we address the following question: How much information is lost due to the decentralization with knowledge fusion? Although a complete answer to this question is not available yet, a partial one is provided below by considering a system motivated by the power plant application.
Let the plant G consist of two process variables V 1 and V 2 , each monitored by two sensors, {S 11 , S 12 } and {S 21 , S 22 }, respectively. Assume that the universal sets of V 1 and V 2 are
V2 , A
V2 ,
where, as before, N stands for Normal and A for Anomalous. Let Z NV 1 and Z AV 1 be the intervals where V 1 is viewed as N V1 and A V1 , respectively, and let
, and Z A 
To combat the curse of dimensionality, introduce two sub-plants, G I and G II , consisting of process variables V 1 and V 2 and their sensors, respectively. Two methods for evaluating the pmf's of V 1 and V 2 are considered below, the centralized and the decentralized with knowledge fusion, and their results are compared.
Centralized assessment (CA):
Each sensor is assigned DQ based on the procedure described in Section II. The state space of the overall sensor network is given by X = {(0000), (1000), (0100), ...., (1111)} ,
which contains 16 states. Let the sensor network be equipped with a rational controller, whose objective is to minimize the penalty function Φ(x), specified as
where the joint pmfp 
To solve the above problem, specify the residence time of the controller in state x ∈ X as
where N is sufficiently large. In this scenario, utilizing the formula similar to (45), the pmfp[
Decentralized assessment with knowledge fusion (DA-KF): Assign DQ to each sensor as before.
Decompose the sensor network with state space (56) into two sub-networks, with state spaces X I and X II defined as follows:
Assume that each sub-network is equipped with a rational controller, whose objective is to minimize the penalty functions
respectively, wherep xI [V 1 ] andp xII [V 2 ] are calculated as in Section III. Assume that unique solutions of these minimization problems exist and are given by
Let the residence time of the rational controllers be specified as in (60). Under this scenario, the pmf's 
In other words,
) are max-similar if their maxima are attained at the same element of Σ V1 (resp. Σ V2 ). We hypothesize that this sufficient condition for the efficacy of decentralized systems with knowledge fusion is applicable to more general scenarios than that considered here. A justification of this hypothesis and derivation of more general conditions are topics for future work.
VII. RESILIENT MONITORING SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Turning now to the issue of computing the pmf's of B, HT, RP, and LT, we introduce a five-layer architecture shown in Figure 3 . It consists of four parallel sub-architectures, each corresponding to a sub-plant, G B , G HT , G RP , and G LT , which could be under a physical attack (or malfunction). The inputs to each sub-architecture are the sensor data provided by the sub-networks SN B , SN HT , SN RP , and SN LT , which could be under a cyber attack. The physical and cyber attacks might be either coordinated or not.
The outputs of the overall architecture are the assessed sub-plant pmf's, i.e.,
p[B],p[HT],p[RP],p[LT].
The five layers of this architecture can be characterized as follows (using the sub-plant B, as an example):
• The DQ acquisition layer remains the same as in Section II.
• The process variable assessment layer consists of two parts. The first one represents the evaluation of • The sub-network adaptation layer operates as described in Section V, but using the entropy ofp xB [V 1 ] as the penalty function.
• The knowledge fusion layer implements the calculations described in Subsection VI-C.
• The sub-plant assessment layer evaluatesp[B],p[HT],p[RP], andp[LT] using the technique of
Section IV.
The measure of resiliency is evaluated using (47) applied separately to each sub-plant, e.g.,
The M R's for HT, RP, and LT are computed similarly, resulting in the following vector: In this section, we apply the resilient monitoring system of Figure 3 to the power plant of Figure 1 .
While the statistics of process variables and the parameters of the monitoring system are specified in the Appendix, below we introduce the sub-plant anomalies (Subsection VIII-A), describe the attack scenarios and the resulting system performance (Subsection VIII-B), and discuss qualitative features of the results
obtained (Subsection VIII-C).
A. Sub-plant anomalies and process variable couplings 1) Boiler:
The anomaly of B is insulation fracture. Since the fracture results in a lower than normal temperature, the universal set of V 1 is Σ V1 := {L V1 , N V1 }.
2) High pressure turbine:
The anomaly of HT is also the insulation fracture. Taking into account the influence B → HT, we assume that V 2 takes progressively increasing values under the following conditions: Both B and HT are damaged; only B is damaged; only HT is damaged; and both B and HT operate normally. As it follows from the above, the universal set of V 2 is 
3) Reheat pipe:
The anomaly of RP is similar to that of B and HT, i.e., the insulation fracture.
Regarding V 3 , we assume that it takes increasing values under the following conditions: Both B and RP are damaged; only B is damaged; only RP is damaged; and both B and RP operate normally. From the
4) Low pressure turbine:
Since LT operates at a low pressure, we assume that the anomaly is not due to the fracture of its insulation, but due to the inefficient transfer of energy to the output shaft, leading to the temperature being higher than normal. Taking LT and B operate normally, while RP is damaged; LT malfunctions and RP is damaged, while B operates normally; LT, RP, and B operate normally; and LT malfunctions, while RP and B operate normally. As it follows from the above,
where M stands for Medium and H for High.
5) Coupling of process variables:
As described in Subsection VI-B, the couplings of the process variables are characterized by the conditional pmf's P [V i |V j ]. Taking into account the universal sets introduced above, these pmf's are as follows:
(67)
6) Universal sets of the sub-plants:
Since each sub-plant is characterized by a single anomaly, the random variable G i , i ∈ {B, HT, RP, LT}, which represents its status, has the universal set comprised of two outcomes, {N Gi , A Gi }, i ∈ {B, HT, RP, LT}, where, as before, N Gi and A Gi stand for normal and anomalous status of the sub-plant G i , respectively.
B. Attack scenarios and the resulting monitoring system performance
In this section, we introduce seven cyber and cyber-physical attack scenarios selected so as to exhibit the main features of the resilient monitoring system designed herein. As it may be expected, physical attacks on the sub-plants are less damaging for resilient monitoring than cyber attacks on the sensors.
Nevertheless, to illustrate that every sub-plant status (normal or anomalous) can be identified with or without a physical attack, we include cyber-physical attacks into consideration as well. Note that if the attack was not coordinated, e.g., physical attack on RP and cyber attack, say, on LT, the status of LT would be undetermined, i.e., Note also that if the attack was not coordinated, e.g., physical attack on LT and cyber attack on all sensors of B, the resulting performance would bē
indicating that all sub-plants are assessed correctly. i.e., all are assessed correctly.
C. Discussion
The above results lead to the following conclusions:
• Under all attack scenarios considered, the resilient monitoring system provides no erroneous assessments (as insinuated by the attacker).
• As evidenced by Scenarios 1-4, cyber attacks on HT and/or LT are more dangerous than those on B and RP. This is due to the structure of the conditional probability matrices (67), which permit inferences from HT and LT to B and RP, but not vice-versa. In other words, cyber-attacking the terminal nodes of the graph of Figure 2 (b) is more dangerous than attacking the initial and/or intermediate ones.
• As evidenced from Scenarios 3 and 4, coordinated cyber-physical attacks may not be more dangerous than non-coordinated ones. More important is not the coordination, but the nature of a cyber attack − involving or not the terminal nodes of the graph.
• As follows from Scenario 7, the minimum number of non-attacked sensors necessary and sufficient to correctly assess all sub-plants is 2: one for HT and one for LT. If these sensors were made "known secure" [27] , the plant assessment would never be compromised.
• In all cases considered, the measure of system resiliency is quite high: from 0.69 (when some sub-plants status remains undetermined) to close to 1 (when all sub-plants status is assessed with certainty).
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This work provides techniques to ensure resiliency and demonstrates that they are adequate for designing resilient plant monitoring systems. The development is carried out under the assumption that each process variable may be either normal or anomalous, and a cyber-physical attacker shifts sensor measurements so as to project misleading information. In this scenario, we develop a decentralized five-layer monitoring system architecture with knowledge fusion, which, on one hand, alleviates the curse of dimensionality and, on the other hand, allows for calculating inferences necessary for resiliency. Although the development is carried out in terms of a power plant, a similar approach can be used for other critical infrastructure plants, as long as they admit a representation as a set of interrelated sub-plants.
Numerous research problems, however, remain open. These include:
• Problems related to overall architecture:
• The decentralized system with knowledge fusion is based on the reduction of a cyclic influence graph to a tree-graph (see Figure 2 ). Extending this decomposition to cyclic graphs is important.
The approach may be quite similar to that of the present work, and, in this framework, the effect of "circular" coupling among process variables could be investigated.
• Another important architectural issue is: What are other than decentralization techniques that can effectively combat the curse of dimensionality in resilient monitoring systems? Perhaps, the overlapping decomposition of [28] , [29] could be a productive alternative.
• Problems related to data quality acquisition:
• Investigating efficacy of the probe-based data quality acquisition technique for attackers other than those modifying the expected value of sensor measurements.
• Improving temporal properties of DQ acquisition. As shown in Subsection V-D, DQ is acquired in about 5sec. It would be desirable to achieve this an order of magnitude faster. A potential approach is inferring DQ from the transient, rather than the steady state, response of a process variable to the probe.
• Introducing and investigating other than probe-based DQ acquisition techniques. Perhaps, this could be accomplished by considering inference diagrams of process variables and continually monitoring the level of their satisfaction in the data provided by the sensors.
• Problems related to process variable assessment:
• Introducing and investigating different than (12) models of coupling between the sensor data and process variables. Similarly, investigating different (as compared with the believability (11)) effects of DQ on process variable assessment.
• Introducing and utilizing other than conditional probability-based coupling (see (24) ) among the process variables. This may be based on logical models "if-then", rather than on quantitative ones.
• In the current work, the sensor data and DQ's are utilized to assess the process variable pmf's (i.e., h-procedure (15), (16)) under the assumption that the state of the sensor network remains constant. Are there convergent techniques to accomplish this when the state of the sensor network is non-stationary? If so, the temporal properties of resilient monitoring systems could be improved substantially.
• Investigating monotonicity properties of Dempster-Shafer rule (21) . A sufficient condition for monotonicity is mentioned in Subsection III-C. More general (e.g., necessary and sufficient)
conditions would be beneficial for improving the speed of process variable pmf's assessment.
• Problems related to sensor network adaptation:
• Utilizing other than (43) rational controllers. The goal here is to devise rational controllers with faster adaptation rates (see [5] where various types of rational controllers are introduced and analyzed).
• Introducing and analyzing other than entropy-based penalty functions. Perhaps, there exists a penalty function that would lead to lower uncertainty in process variable assessment than the entropy.
• Investigating a possibility of associating a rational controller with each sensor of the sensor network. Although this would lead to a non-stationary adaptation environment, it would result, if convergent, in a substantial improvement of adaptation rates.
• Problems related to knowledge fusion:
• Evaluation of the efficacy of knowledge fusion. This would involve the derivation of more general conditions to quantify, for example, the loss of information due to knowledge fusion calculations.
• At present, just a rudimentary technique has been used at this layer: a "combination" of process variable pmf's obtained in different sub-architectures (see Figure 3 ). It would be of interest to investigate fusing information measures other than the pmf's.
• Problems related to plant assessment:
• Investigating a possibility of recursive plant assessment. Because recursive application of the Jeffrey rule may lead to paradoxical result (see Section IV), in the current paper we apply this rule non-recursively, which slows down the plant pmf assessment. So, modifying this rule or developing a new one, which would permit a recursive application, is an important problem.
Solutions of these problems will enable designing effective resilient monitoring systems for critical infrastructures (e.g., power systems, computer networks, civil engineering objects) and complex individual plants (e.g., aircraft and space structures). As mentioned in Section III, Part 1 of this theorem is proved in [24] . Below, we prove Part 2. It is based on the following lemmas:
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Lemma A.1. Consider the recursive procedure (15) , (16), (18) . Then,
Proof: As it follows from (15),
Thus, h σ (n) ≥ 0, ∀n and ∀σ. Also, it can be shown that, due to (18),
where the last inequality is due to (16) . Finally, in view of (A.3), this inequality becomes
Lemma A.2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the expected value of the set point, h * σ (s n ), σ ∈ Σ V , n ∈ N, is given by
Proof: Follows directly from (16).
Thus, according to this lemma, the expected value of h * σ (s n ) is independent of n ∈ N, and can be denoted as
To formulate the next lemma, introduce the function
] is differentiable and convex in h σ (n) and, therefore, its unique minimum is attained at
Due to (A.6), this expression becomes h σ (n) − µ h * σ = 0, implying that for any fixed n ∈ N, the solution of the minimization problem is h min
Proof of Theorem 1, Part 2:
The proof is based on showing that for large n, the recursive procedure (15), (16), (18) solves the aforementioned minimization problem, and, therefore, h σ (n) converges to µ h * σ , σ ∈ Σ V , almost surely.
Since f (h σ (n)), σ ∈ Σ V , is continuously differentiable and convex, there exists a scalar 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 such that
From (A.6) and (15), (16), we obtain
Using the summation of both sides of (A.10), we obtain:
Now, consider the limit of (A.11) as n → ∞. Since h σ (n) is bounded for all n (see Lemma A.1), the left hand side of the above equation is a finite positive number. Due to the same reason, the term
Observe that since ∞ n=0 ǫ 2 h (n) < ∞, the last term in the right hand side of (A.12) is bounded. Now, suppose ∂f ∂hσ(n) does not go to 0 as n tends to ∞. Then the expression
is unbounded (due to ∞ n=0 ǫ h (n) = ∞) and the right hand side of (A.12) becomes −∞. This is a contradiction, since the left hand side is positive and bounded. Therefore, ∂f ∂hσ(n) → 0 as n → ∞ almost surely (a.s.). From the above arguments, E ∂f ∂hσ(n) → 0 as n → ∞. Furthermore, due to the linearity of expectation, ∂ ∂hσ(n) E[f (h σ (n))] → 0 as n → ∞, implying that the condition (A.8) is satisfied. Therefore, from Lemma A.3, it is clear that lim n→∞ h σ (n) = µ h * σ , σ ∈ Σ V , a.s. Finally, using Lemma A.2, we conclude that
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Since h σ (n) is convergent a.s., for every ǫ, there exists n 0 (ǫ), such that P |h NV (n) − h ss NV | < ǫ > 1 − ǫ, ∀n > n 0 (ǫ). Therefore, for sufficiently large n, equation (41) can be rewritten as
where
and O(ǫ) represents terms of order ǫ. Omitting these terms, equation (A.13) is approximated as
It can be shown that the system (A.15) has three equilibria,
Based on the perturbation theory [30] , for ǫ sufficiently small, stability properties of (A.15) are the same as (A.13). To analyze stability, consider the Jacobians of F ( · ) at each equilibrium:
(A. 17) Suppose h ss NV > 1 − a. Since 0 < a < 0.5, we have A 1 < 1, A 2 > 1, and A 3 > 1, implying that k * NG is asymptotically stable, while k * * NG and k * * * NG are not. Therefore, k NG (n) converges locally to k * NG as n → ∞, which proves Part 1 of the theorem. Parts 2 and 3 can be proved similarly.
C. Theorem 3
The proof of this theorem is based on the following five lemmas. 
] be the pmf of V 2 , calculated using total probability formula:
where Σ 1 and P [V 2 |V 1 ] are specified by (54) and (55), respectively. Then, 19) where I{ · } is the entropy.
Proof: Due to the structure of
. Consequently, the entropy ofp xI [V 1 ] can be evaluated as
where Σ 2 is defined in (54). Then, applying the change of base formula, log a x = log b x log b a , the right hand side (RHS) of (A. 20) 
Proof: The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma A. 4 . controllers adapt in such a manner that the entropy of the pmf of V 2 is minimized.
is their concatenation using Dempster-Shafer rule. Then, 
where, due to the constraint,
Using (A.25), equation (A.24) can be re-written as follows:
Since, as it follows from (A.23), the partial derivative,
, we obtain the following differential for the denominator of the first expression of (A.22):
In a similar manner, it can be shown that the numerator of this expression is given by:
Suppose, dp 1 > 0 and dp 2 = dp 3 = 0. Then, the RHS of (A.27) becomes log 4 p4 p1 dp 1 , implying that dI {p xI [V 2 ]} < 0. Using (A.28), it can also be shown that dI p (xI,xII) [V 2 ] < 0. Moreover, in all other situations where dI {p xI [V 2 ]} is less than zero (for instance, when dp 1 > 0, dp 2 > 0, dp 3 = 0, p 2 > p 4 , and q 2 > q 4 ), it can be shown that dI p (xI,xII) [V 2 ] is less than zero as well. These arguments imply Proof: We prove this lemma for the state x I ∈ X I . The proof for x II ∈ X II is similar.
Suppose, x I = (10) I . Let the pmf of the corresponding active sensor, namely, S 11 , be p[
NB . Since this sensor is captured, its data quality is assigned as DQ S11 = ǫ based on the d.c. gain model (3) and the procedure described in Section II. In this situation, the pmfp xI [V 1 ], calculated using the h-procedure, is as follows (see (15) , (16) As it follows from (A.32), the expression −a 1 (ǫ) log 2 a 1 (ǫ) − a 2 (ǫ) log 2 a 2 (ǫ) → 1 as ǫ → 0.
Differentiating both sides of (A.33) with respect to ǫ, we obtain 
2) Models of process variables and sensors:
The values of the parameters introduced here are not intended to represent exact physical quantities but, rather, to illustrate the techniques developed in this work.
The domains of the process variables and their d.c. gains (defined in Assumption 1) are specified in Table I .
Without loss of generality, we assume that the process variables and the sensor measurements are Tables II and III , respectively, for all attack scenarios considered in Section VIII. Regarding the standard deviations ofṼ i andS ij , we assume that they are small enough so that the realizations of these random variables outside of the domains given in Table I may be ignored. Specifically, they are selected as σṼ 
B. Parameters of monitoring system
1) Data quality assessment layer:
• The amplitudes of the probing signals (6) are selected as follows: A V1 = 2, A V2 = 0.6, A V3 = 0.7, and A V4 = 0.3.
• The parameter ǫ, involved in (10) , is selected as 0.02.
• The P IC max in (10) for the sensors of B, HT, RP, and LT are 0.4, 0.06, 0.08, 0.03, respectively.
2) Process variables assessment layer:
• The step size of the h-procedure (15) is selected as ǫ h = 0.01.
• The stopping rule is defined by |h σ (n + 1) − h σ (n)| < 10 −4 .
3) Adaptation layer:
The parameters involved in (43) are selected as follows:
• The level of rationality of the rational controller is selected as N = 2.
• The maximum residence time is selected as T max = 1sec.
• The parameter β is chosen as 0.04.
